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INTRODUCTION

"Freedom of information" has two connotations. One—older,
more obvious for this forum, and dominant in legal circles—involves
access to information about and/or in the possession of the government,
as in, of course, the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). The other
meaning is not limited to government records and is a slogan of the
information age. It is almost a pun; the term refers not just to an indi
vidual right to information, it comes close to asserting a liberty interest
enjoyed by the information itself. This idea blends into "the unofficial
motto of the free content movement:"^ "information wants to be free,"
which plays upon—or has come to play upon—the multiple meanings
of "free." In 2003, The World Summit on the Information Society
adopted a Declaration of Principles that incorporates these ideas:
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University.
I See Wikipedia, Information Wants to be Free, hrtp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_
wants_to_be_free (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). The phrase "information wants to be free" is
generally credited to Stewart Brand, who explicitly meant "free" as opposed to "expensive." Id.
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We reaffirm, as an essential foundation of the Information Soci
ety . . . that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres
sion; that this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers. Communication is a
fundamental social process, a basic human need and the foundation of
all social organization. It is central to the Information Society. Every
one, everywhere should have the opportunity to participate and no
one should be excluded from the benefits the Information Society
offers.^

The Freedom of Information Act rests on and advances the first mean
ing of "freedom of information." FOIA's central justifications have to
do with informing the public about what the government is up to.^ The
paradigmatic sorts of records obtainable have to do with activities of the
agency, not information about the world. And the information does not
flow freely; it has to be pulled, or extracted, from the agency through a
request.
But the more far-flung and vaguely Utopian understanding of
"freedom of information" is not irrelevant to the government and gov
ernment information. The information age has infiltrated and altered
the government in many ways. The federal government is making un
precedented amounts of information available to the public. To the ex
tent this transformation has occurred, it is the result of societal and
technological changes—in particular, the overwhelming movement of
society, and government along with it, online. The law has had very
little to do with it. The law lags.
This article will describe and comment on the way in which FOIA
has become more peripheral than it once was and than it should be.
FOIA's fundamental limitation is its failure to impose affirmative re
sponsibilities on agencies. In particular, (a) it does not require agencies
to generate information, and (b) it imposes only minimal (and fre
quently disregarded) obligations to disseminate information without be2 World Summit on the Information Society, Declaration of Principles: Building the Informa
tion Society: a global challenge in the new Millennium,!A.4, Document WSIS-03/GENEVA/
DOC/4-E, available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/officiai/dop.htmi (last visited Apr.
5, 2009).
3 See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978). "The basic pur
pose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society,
needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed. Id.
at 242.
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ing asked. In the Information Age, these restrictions are more
problematic than ever. A reinvented FOIA might involve agencies that
generate, interpret, and disseminate information for the public benefit;
the government would be a sort of non-profit publishing house. We are
far from such a world, and it would not be an unmitigated blessing. But
we should be moving more in that direction.
Reimagining the Freedom of Information Act is far beyond the
scope of this brief Article. I will limit myself to consideration of the
need for a broader obligation of affirmative disclosures by agencies.
II.

GOVERNMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

It is worth distinguishing different sorts of information possessed
by the government and the agencies within it. Consider the following
taxonomy:
1. Information about the agency and its activities'. What is the
agency doing, who is it investigating, what policies is it pursuing, is it
abusing its power? This material is at the heart of FOIA as it is gener
ally understood. FOIA is seen as reflecting the need for an informed
citizenry to understand and provide oversight of the government that,
ultimately, answers to them, and the release of information which fur
thers government transparency. This category also includes information
about agency enforcement activities, such as the agency's interpretations
of statutes, enforcement policies, rules for testing on new products, and
so on. Thus, this is information that people need and use as citizens and
as regulated entities.
2. Information about how to interact with the agency. This is infor
mation of value to anyone doing business with or seeking benefits from
the agency, such as procedures for applying for government benefits or
grants or employment, procurement practices and regulations, and
product specifications. The web has made possible an enormous and
uncontroversial expansion in the provision of such information. The
Bush Administration's 25 E-Government initiatives were primarily fo
cused on facilitating such interaction between the government and its
suppliers and "customers;" indeed, the administrations E-Government
Strategy was subtitled "Simplified Delivery of Services to Citizens."^
4 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, E-GOVERNMENT TASK FORCE, E-GOVERNMENT
STRATEGY: SIMPLIFIED DELIVERY OF SERVICES TO CITIZENS (Feb. 27, 2002), available at http://

\vww.usa.gov/Topics/Includes/Reference/cgov_strategy.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
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3. Information about the entities regulated by the agency. This infor
mation is compiled by government agencies but is not about the govern
ment. It includes such data as compliance records, emissions
monitoring, the contents of quarterly and annual reports, and product
safety information. Dissemination of such information can be of value
for private rather than public goals (for example, to aid competitors)
and poses particularly strong issues of confidentiality, privacy, trade
secrets, and the like. But recent decades have increasingly seen reliance
on the quasi-regulatory effects of disclosing such information. ^ An im
portant trend in the last decades is increased gathering and public dis
semination of such information as a regulatory tool that has impacts on
primary conduct. The Toxic Release Inventory ("TRI") is the leading
example.® TRI requires firms to report all environmental releases of
toxic substances. It imposes no limits on such releases but has been
credited tvitb leading to enormous reductions in emissions.^ Other ex
amples exist. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has
created web access to its Integrated Management Information System,
which bad been a purely in-bouse tool. Now any person with a com
puter can go online and search by company name to discover which
firms have been inspected and what the inspectors found.® The Envi
ronmental Protection Agency's Enforcement and Compliance History
Online ("ECHO") is a similar resource, allowing users to determine
what facilities have been inspected, what violations were found, and
what enforcement actions, if any, were taken.® In five years of opera
tion, ECHO has provided data for five million queries.'®
5 For a discussion of information disclosure as a tool of environmental protection, see gen
erally E. Donald Elliot, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program That
Works!, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1840, 1849-151 (1994); Tom Tietenberg, Disclosure Strategies for
Pollution Control, 11 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 587 (1998).
"5 See Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 313, 100 Stat. 1741 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2006)). See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen. Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking Precursor
to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001). The Toxic Release Inventory "requires facilities
that meet minimum size and emission thresholds to report, on standardized forms, their annual
releases of listed toxic pollutants
" Id. at 259. The importance and impact of Toxic Release
Inventory were increased exponentially by the development of the World Wide Web.
•7 Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 259-60.
8 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Establishment Search Page, http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establish
ment.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
^ U.S. E.P.A., Enforcement dr Compliance Online, http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo/ (last vis
ited Jan. 25, 2009).
10 Id.
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4. Information about the world: This category includes information
on the health effects of chemicals, environmental quality, details of par
ticular products (e.g., crashworthiness or gas mileage), and the reams of
scientific studies and information that federal agencies collect, as well as
other data. Access to such information informs citizens, workers, and
consumers, enabling them to participate more effectively in the political,
workplace, and economic marketplaces.
FOIA was written with just the first of these four categories in
mind. But agency records, especially non-exempt agency records, be
long overwhelmingly in the latter categories. And increasingly it is
understood that dissemination of such information can have salutary
effects. In the Information Age, the government is a voracious con
sumer and generator of information. It should also be a generous con
duit and disseminator. And it should—indeed, it can only do so
through the internet.
The federal government's web presence has been transformed in
the past decade. However, agency web sites remain a mixed bag.
The overall movement is toward increased proactive disclosure, but it
still has a long ways to go. It would be much further advanced than it is
but for the September 11th Attacks, which prompted, understandably, a
new circumspection about what materials could be made publicly availa
ble. A month after the attacks. Attorney General John Ashcroft, more
in general mode than attorney mode,^^ issued a brief but pointed mem
orandum regarding FOIA. The memorandum, which withdrew a 1993
memo from his predecessor, Janet Reno, emphasized the interests that
might conflict with robust disclosure of government records: "safeguard
ing our national security, enhancing the effectiveness of our law enforce
ment agencies, protecting sensitive business information and, not least,
preserving personal privacy." It instructed agencies to withhold any
records if there was "a sound legal basis for doing so.
This repre11 For a brief overview, see Sidney A. Shapiro, The Information Quality Act and Environmen
tal Protection: The Perils of Reform by Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL Y
REV. 339, 341-44 (2004).
12 National Security Archive, Mixed Signals, Mixed Results: How President Bush s Executive
Order on FOLA Failed to Deliver 13-16 (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB246/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2009) \foexEm3.ket Mixed Results].

13 See generally Michael Herz, Washington, Patton, Schwarzkopf, and .. . Ashcroft?, 19
CONST. COMM. 663, 675-676 (2003).
14 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, on the Freedom of Information
Act, to Heads of all Federal Agencies and Departments (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://
www. usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/200 lfoiapostl9.htm.
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sented a shift from the Clinton Administration policy, which had called
for disclosure absent "foreseeable harm."^' The Bush Administration
also took a more expansive view of what documents were exempt from
disclosure as classified and withheld records that it considered, contro
versially, sensitive but unclassified.^®
Notwithstanding this wariness, the Bush Administration has made
significant strides in moving government on-line, which is the sine qua
non of participation in the Information Age. This movement will only
accelerate in the Ohama Administration.'^ But this shift occurred, and
is occurring, largely outside the purview of FOIA, for reasons the fol
lowing section explores.
III.

FOIA's LIMITATIONS

FOIA is indisputably powerful open government legislation. Four
characteristics stand out.
First, the right to know is independent of the need to know. Under
FOIA, the requestor need not justify the request by establishing a need
to know, explaining the purpose for which the document is sought or
offering credentials of any sort.'® Explicitly, ''any person"'^ can request
an agency record and, implicitly, can do so for any reason or no reason
at all. If someone asks for a non-exempt document in the agency's posMemorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, on the Freedom of Information Act,
to Heads of all Federal Agencies and Departments (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_updates/Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm.
16 On the setback the September Ilth Attacks caused to a general trend toward greater
openness, see James T. O'Reilly, "Access to Records" Versus "Access to Evil:" Should Disclosure Laws
Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records Release, 12 KAN. J. L. PUB. POLY 559, 568-74 (2003).
17 On his first day in office. President Ohama issued an important memorandum on govern
ment transparency. See Memorandum from President Barack Ohama, to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (2009).
Two months later. Attorney General Eric Holder withdrew the 2001 Ashcroft memorandum,
issuing new FOIA Guidelines emphasizing transparency, openness, presumptive disclosure, and
timeliness. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney General, on the Freedom of Informa
tion Act, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf. The Guidelines are discussed and described by
U.S. D.O.J., Office of Information Policy, President Obama's FOIA Memorandum and Attorney
General Holder's FOIA Guidelines: Creating a "New Era of Open Government," FOIA POST (Apr.
17, 2009), available at http://tvww.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2009foiapost8.htm (last visited Apr.
24, 2009).
18 NLRB V. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
19 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
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session, the agency must provide it, no questions asked.^" This ap
proach was a fundamental shift from the pre-FOIA Administrative
Procedure Act, which gave wide discretion to agencies to withhold
records if the requester was not "properly and directly concerned" or if
the agency determined to keep the records confidential "for good cause
found."^^
Second, at least in theory, the agency cannot stonewall or bury the
request. The government custodian of requested records must respond
to valid requests within twenty days, either disclosing the record or ex
plaining why it is exempt from disclosure.^^ Of course, in the real
world, these firm and strikingly short deadlines are routinely exceeded.
Delays in handling FOIA requests seem to be an ineradicable feature of
the statute's administration.^^ Some efforts have been made in recent
years to speed up the process. Executive Order 13,392,^'* issued at the
end of 2005, required each agency to designate a chief FOIA officer
and, among other things, develop a plan to streamline the handling of
requests and reduce the backlog of unanswered requests,^' Unfortu
nately, only modest progress seems to have been made under the order.^^ The 2007 OPEN Government Act^^ was designed to reduce
backlogs and speed responses; the Department of Justice's 2009 FOIA
20 Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988); see also Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts,
492 U.S. 136 (1989).
21 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 3(c), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 238 (1946)
(formerly codified at 5 U.S.C. 1005).
22 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (2006). To be precise; the agency must inform the requestor
within twenty days of the agency's intention to comply with or deny the request. Id. at
§ 552(a)(6)(A)(i). The requestor may appeal a denial to the agency head, who must decide the
appeal within twenty working days. Id. In unusual circumstances, the agency may extend either
twenty-day limit by ten working days. Id. at § 552(a)(6)(B). If the agency anticipates that the
extended time period will still be too brief, it must provide the requester the opportunity to
either limit the scope of the request or arrange a new or alternative time limit. Id. at
§ 552(a)(6)(B)(ii).
23 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-59, at 3 (2007). "Chief among the problems with FOIA are
the major delays encountered by FOIA requestors." Id. The only sanction for violating the
required time limits is for the requester to treat it as a denial and either appeal or litigate in
federal courts. Spannus v. Dep't of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 57-59 (B.C. Cir. 1987).

24 E.O. 13,392, Improving Agency Disclosure of Information, 70 Fed. Reg. 75,'i7'i (Dec. 14,
2005).
25 Id. at §§ 2(a), 3(b)(ii).
26 See generally Mixed Results, supra note 12.
27 OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (codified at 5
U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. 2008)).
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Guidelines also emphasize times responses.^® The jury is still out on
whether these ostensible reforms will in fact reduce the backlog.
Third, FOIA makes all documents presumptively releasable. All
records must be released unless they fall within one of the nine statutory
exemptions.^^
Fourth, the denial of a request is subject to judicial review, under
standards that favor the requester. The standard of review is a de novo
rather than arbitrary and capricious standard;^" the burden is on the
agency to prove that records are exempt rather than on the requestor to
show they are not;^' and jurisdiction lies in district court rather than in
a court of appeals,^^ with full discovery and the opportunity to make a
record.
These characteristics combine to make FOIA a truly powerful tool
for disclosure of information held by the government, notwithstanding
the somewhat fictional nature of the time limits. And yet, despite these
characteristics, FOIA falls miles short of being a complete window into
the government. A great deal of information is unavailable, in theory or
in practice. In part, and most obviously, this is because of the exemp
tions, the precise scope of which has always been and will always be a
matter of dispute. Clearly there must be exemptions; clearly they can be
written or read too broadly or too narrowly. But that is not a structural
characteristic of the particular form FOIA takes. The question of the
scope of exemptions is enormously important, but it is outside the scope
of this Article.
Two other limitations are inherent in the statute's structure and
approach. First, FOIA imposes only minimal affirmative duties of dis
closure; the basic model is that a record is released only if and when
someone requests it. Agencies need not be forthcoming. Second, FOIA
imposes no obligation to generate, compile or interpret information. The
statute applies solely to "records" which exist independently of the stat
es See Dep't of Justice, Office of Information Policy, supra note 17.
29 This is plain from the basic structure of the Act, which requires agencies to make re
quested records "promptly available to any person," period, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2006),
and then provides that the section "does not apply to matters that" fail within the nine specified
exemptions. Id. at § 552(b). These exemptions reflect Congress's "general philosophy of full
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language."
S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965).
30 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006).
31 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989).
32 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
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ute. Thus, it creates some disincentive to create records^^ and is only a
minimal step toward providing citizens with knowledge, as opposed to
information.
I will focus on the first of these structural limitations. Of course,
in 1966, requiring the government to provide records on request was a
breakthrough. But requiring the government to provide records only on
request is a hobbling and increasingly unjustifiable limitation. In David
Vladeck's assessment, "[tjhis is FOIA's Achilles' heel."^"* He explains
the following:
The process of drafting and submitting FOIA requests and then wait
ing for the agency's response is a breeding ground for delay and cyni
cism over the Act's efficacy. Requesters with time-sensitive needs for
information find FOIA's cumbersome request-and-wait-for-a-response
approach an often-fatal barrier to the statute's usefulness. The process
also invites disputes over whether the requester directed the request to
the appropriate governmental entity and described the requested
records with adequate specificity, which in turn engender more delay
and cynicism.

Not only is the request-driven approach contentious and time-consum
ing, it is inherently limited by the fact that the requester, by definition,
does not know what the agency has and, therefore, does not know what
to ask for. Some requests will be unfounded and inappropriately broad.
Others will be self-defeatingly narrow, failing to say the magic words to
obtain a non-exempt, valuable record that the requester just did not
know how to ask for.^®

33 The Federal Records Act does at least prevent, at least in theory, the destruction of agency
records except as authorized by the Archivist of the United States. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3303
3303(a) (2006).
34 David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal
Right-to-Knaw Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (2008).
35 Id.
36 This is sometimes referred to as "the requester's paradox." See, e.g.. Statement of Ari
Schwartz, Center for Democracy & Technology, before the House Government Reform Sub
committee on Government Management, Finance, and Accountability on the Freedom of Infor
mation Act, at 2 (May 11, 2005) ("[T]he 'requester's paradox' — 'how can I know to request a
specific document, when I don't even know that the document exists.'"').
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INCREMENTAL SHIFTS UNDER FOIA AWAY FROM THE
REQUEST-DRIVEN PROCESS

To be fair, FOIA is not entirely request-driven. This section lays
out the ways in which the current statute imposes some affirmative du
ties of disclosure.
A.

Reading Rooms

From the outset, FOIA required that certain items be either pub
lished in the Federal Register or "made available for public inspection
and copying.Items in the first category, now known as "(a)(1) mate
rial," after the relevant section of the amended statute, include descrip
tions of agency organization, rules of procedure, and proposed and final
regulations.^® The second category, "(a)(2) material," originally con
sisted of final opinions and orders in agency adjudications, statements of
policy and interpretive rules that were not published in the Federal Regis
ter, and administrative staff manuals.^' Hard copies of these were to be
maintained in "reading rooms" (a term that does not appear in the stat
ute) open to the public.^" Thus, some material must actually be pub
lished and some made generally available, even absent a request for it.
These are requirements of affirmative disclosure. But they have two
fundamental limitations. First, the meaningfulness of the disclosure is
limited by the mechanism of disclosure. For most citizens, these materi
als remained largely unavailable, since accessing them required both
some sophistication and a trip to Washington. Second, these provisions
do not require affirmative disclosure of government information.
Rather, they provide for disclosure of law. The idea, frequently stated,
was to avoid the existence of "secret law." As the Supreme Court has
explained, "The affirmative portion of the Act . . . represents a strong
congressional aversion to 'secret [agency] law,' and represents an affirm
ative congressional purpose to require disclosure of documents which
37 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2006).
38 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2006) (requiring each agency to publish in the Federal Register
descriptions of the agency, statements of its general policies, rules of procedure, and substantive
rules and statements of general policy of general applicability). This provision was section 3(a)
of the 1966 Act.
39 14. at §§ 552(a)(2)(A), (B), and (C) (requiring each agency to make available for inspec
tion and copying final opinions in agency adjudications, statements of policy and interpretations
that were not published in the Federal Register, and staff manuals). This provision was section
3(b) of the 1966 Act.

40 Id.
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have the force and effect of law."^' The idea has roots in the Due Pro
cess Clause and in the fundamental jurisprudential principle that for
"law" to merit the name, it must be knowable and known by those to
whom it applies.^^
In short, for its first thirty years, FOIA imposed no meaningful
obligation of affirmative disclosure of government information.
B.

Electronic Reading Rooms

This changed in 1996. The significance of the reading room idea,
and thus the importance of the distinction between (a)(1) material and
(a)(2) material, on the one hand, and (a)(3) material (all other agency
records, which can be obtained only upon request), on the other, be
came enormously more important with the development of the internet.
Once the reading room can be electronic, then material found therein is
truly publicly available. Congress was a little late to this realization, but
in the 1996 Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments,
("EFOIA") it significantly expanded the reading room concept. First, it
required agencies to provide electronic access to all (a)(2) material cre
ated after November 1, 1996. That is, every agency must maintain a
website to which it posts all post-1996 records that FOIA requires to be
made available in a reading room. Simultaneously, Congress dramati
cally expanded the scope of § 552(a)(2); it now also includes,
all records, regardless of form or format, which have been released to
any person [who made a specific request therefore] and which, because
of the nature of their subject matter, the agency determines have be
come or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests for
substantially the same records.^^

In other words, anything that has been or is likely to be requested three
times—the initial request plus subsequent "requests" (plural)—must
"be made available for inspection and copying," i.e., go into the reading
NLRB V. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975) (quoting Kenneth Gulp
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 797 (1967), and
H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 7 (1966)); see also Frank Easterbrook, Privacy and the Optimal
Extent of Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 775, 777 (1980)
(stating the purpose of FOIA is to eliminate "secret law").
42 See, e.g., LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969) (describing eight
"routes to disaster" that "result in something that is not properly called a legal system at all," all
of which involve ways in which it proves impossible to know or comply with the law).
43 5 U.s.c. § 552(a)(2)(D) (2006).
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room.^'* And again, any material created after November 1996 that
must be made available for inspection and copying must be made availa
ble electronically.
Thus, the idea of EFOIA is to put online anything of sufficient
general interest that three people tvant to see it enough to ask for it. By
the express terms of the statute, it is not necessary that three people have
already asked; it suffices that the document has been requested once and
two other requests "are likely." As one observer has written, the basic
thrust of EFOIA was to shift from a system in which requesters endure
lengthy delays while waiting for paper copies of records "to a model in
which agencies anticipate requests and act to make records (and infor
mation on how to find additional records) available over online
systems.
EFOIA has not wholly lived up to its promise. Although practices
vary, not surprisingly, from agency to agency, in general agencies have
placed only a fraction of the material that should be available in their
reading rooms. Consider one specific example. As Michael Gerrard and
I have written elsewhere,''^ every Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") prepared since 1996 should be available in the relevant agency's
electronic reading room. The National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS before undertak
ing actions that may have a significant effect on environmental quality.^^ Historically, these have been multi-volume, hard copy
documents—difficult to locate, transport, or search. Agencies are in
creasingly posting both draft and final EIS s, along with background
documents, online, but the shift has been inexcusably (and illegally)
slow. The FOIA argument is straightforward. EIS's and related envi
ronmental documents are agency "records; NEPA itself makes them so.
44 Id.
45 Michael Tankersley, Opening Drawers: A Requester's Guide to the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act Amendments, LEGAL TIMES, May 19, 1997, at 29. See also generally Michael E.
Tankersley, How the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 Update Public
Access for the Information Age, 50 ADMIN. L.J. 421 (1998).
46 Michael Gerrard & Michael Herz, Harnessing Information Technology to Improve the Envi
ronmental Impact Review Process, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 18 (2003).
47 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). This "detailed statement" must address "the environ
mental impact of the proposed action," any unavoidable adverse environmental impacts, alter
natives to the proposed action," the "relationship between local short-term uses of [the]
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any irre
versible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented." Id.
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requiring that an EIS "shall be made available to . . . the public as
provided by" FOIA.^® Prior to 1996, they would have been "(a)(3) ma
terial." Thus, FOIA imposed no affirmative duty on the agency to pro
vide or disseminate EIS's unless and until it received a request for them.
But EIS's easily fall within the frequently requested records provision of
the 1996 Amendments. Any EIS that has been, or can be expected to
be, asked for by three or more people must be posted to the web. It
would be the rare EIS that would not be the subject of three requests.
Yet one simply does not find many EIS's in agency reading rooms,^^ and
the gap is hardly limited to EIS's.
President Bush's 2005 FOIA Executive Order 13,392, nods toward
this problem without really grappling with it. The order requires each
agency to designate a senior agency official as Chief FOIA Officer.^®
Among this officer's duties is an overall review of the agency's FOIA
operations, including, "review [of] the agency's policies and practices
relating to the availability of public information through websites and
other means, including the use of websites to make available the records
described in section 552(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code."^^ On the
basis of this review, each agency was to develop a plan for 2006 and
2007 that, among other things,
include[d] specific activities that the agency will implement to elimi
nate or reduce the agency's FOIA backlog, including . . . increased
reliance on the dissemination of records that can be made available to
48 Id.
49 This does not mean that the EIS's are not available somewhere on the agency's website.
For example, the Department of the Interior, which produces many EIS's, has in recent years
done a good job of getting them on-line. See, e.g., Geothermal Resources Leasing Programmatic
EIS (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/geothermaI/geothermal_nationwide.html. But it does not place them in or link to them from its electronic reading
room. See U.S. Dept. of the Interior, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, http://www.doi.gov/
foia/readroom.html.
50 Exec. Order No. 13,392, ? 2(a), 70 Fed. Reg. 75,373 (2005). In 2007, Congress wrote
this requirement into the statute itself. See OPEN Government Act § 10, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(j),
(k), (1) (Supp. 2008). The new law directs agencies to designate a Chief FOIA Officer and one
or more FOIA Public Liaisons. The Chief FOIA Officer has "agency-wide responsibility for
efficient and appropriate compliance" with FOIA and is required to "monitor implementation"
of FOIA and recommend to the agency head "such adjustments to agency practices, policies,
personnel, and funding as may be necessary to improve its implementation." The Chief FOIA
Officers report to the Attorney General through the head of the agency. The Attorney General
can require the Chief FOIA Officers to submit reports on their agency's performance "at such
times and in such formats" as he establishes. Id.
51 Exec. Order No. 13,392, ? 3(a)(iv), 70 Fed. Reg. 75,373, at f 3(a)(iv) (2005).
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the public through a website or other means that do not require the
public to make a request for the records under the FOIA.'^

Thus, the order nudges agencies toward full satisfaction of the (a)(2)
requirements and suggests going beyond the statutory minima by put
ting records on-line that do not (yet) constitute (a)(2) material, in antic
ipation of their being requested."
In the three years since E.O. 13,302 was issued, it appears that
many agencies have increased the amount of material that is affirma
tively disclosed. According to a May 2008 Department of Justice sum
mary of the reports it had received from individual agencies, there has
been progress." Yet despite the sunny, self-serving reports of the agen
cies, most still seem to be falling short. The general failure was de
scribed in a December 2007 report from the National Security Archive
at George Washington University entitled File Not Found.^'' According
to the study, only twenty-one percent of federal agencies had electronic
reading rooms that contained all four types of materials required: opin
ions and orders, statements of policy, agency manuals, and frequently
requested records." Interestingly, the first three items, which have been
required to be made available (though not electronically) from the be
ginning, were missing more often than the fourth. Fifty-nine percent of
agencies included frequently requested records in their electronic read
ing rooms.^^
Of course, the fact that some such records are available in electronic
reading rooms does not mean that everything that is supposed to be
there in fact is. The fifty-nine percent figure should not be reassuring.
It means that forty-one percent of agencies have not posted a single doc
ument in this category; it is simply impossible to believe that these agen
cies have never had a FOIA request for a document that was, or is likely
to be, requested two more times. And it is a moral certainty that at least
52 Id. at ? 3(b)(ii).
53 Id. at §§ 3(a)(iv), (b)(ii).
5"^ See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE OR
DER 13,392, 5? 11(2), (3) (2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/ag-rpt08/ag-report-topresident06012008.htm.
55 NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, FILE NOT FOUND: 10 YEARS AFTER E-FOIA, MOST
FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE DELINQUENT (2007), avaikhle at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/

NSAEBB/NSAEBB2l6/err.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
56 Id. at 7.
57 Id. at 8-9.
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some of the fifty-nine percent who have put some frequently requested
records in their electronic reading rooms are underposting.'®
In summary, the electronic reading room created by EFOIA does
not fundamentally shift the statute from the request-driven model. A
record must be posted only if it has been requested (and is likely to be
requested at least two more times). As DOJ has explained: "Fundamen
tally, this reading room provision does not even come into play until an
agency processes and discloses records under the Act in the first place.
For an agency to post a record in anticipation of future requests "would
be so premature, at least in relation to subsection (a)(2)(D), that it
would amount to according 'reading room' treatment to records on an
entirely gratuitous, or discretionary, basis.Moreover, Congress' most
recent amendments, the 2007 OPEN Government Act,"^^ do nothing to
increase affirmative disclosure of agency records. That legislation fo
cuses on the delay issue. While it does write some of E.G. 13,392 into
the U.S. Code, it is silent with regard to any duties of affirmative disclo
sure or electronic reading rooms. Finally, agency compliance with the
disclosure obligations of 552(a)(2) has been spotty.
V.

OTHER LEGISLATION

Other legal requirements endorse useful and transparent agency
websites, and promote the movement of information online, but fall
short of creating affirmative disclosure requirements for agencies.
58 As the report states:
At certain large or decentralized agencies, there is very poor compliance with affirma
tive posting obligations. Even though it is difficult for members of the public to assess
whether agencies are posting frequently requested records, it seems unlikely that large
departments receiving tens of thousands of FOIA requests each year do not receive
multiple requests for at least some documents, particularly those that relate to current
events or major policies or actions of the agency. In some cases, it was apparent that
only one or two components contributed frequently requested records to agency elec
tronic reading rooms or only a few components maintained their own electronic read
ing rooms. Such lack of consistency and oversight across a large agency suggests that
some E-FOIA required documents fall through the cracks and are never made availa
ble to the public.
Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
55 U.S. Dep't of Justice, FOIA Counselor Q&A: "Frequently Requested" Records, FOIA POST,
(July 25, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2003foiapost28.htm.
60 Id.

61 See supra note 22.
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The Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act ("PRA'T^ is primarily concerned
with minimizing the paperwork burden on regulated entities and with
ensuring oversight of agency information requests through the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB ). However, the Act also contains
some general provisions concerning the management and dissemination
of
Qne of Congress' purposes in enacting the PRA was
to "provide for the dissemination of public information on a timely ba
sis, on equitable terms, and in a manner that promotes the utility of the
information to the public and makes effective use of information tech
nology."®^ In particular, the 1995 Amendments to the PRA require
every agency to "ensure that the public has timely and equitable access
to the agency's public information.
Such access is to be ensured by,
among other things, "dissemination ... in an efficient, effective, and
economical manner."®® Given the state of current technology, in most
instances posting to a website is the most efficient, effective, and eco
nomical manner" in which to disseminate information and, therefore, is
required by the PRA.
So far so good. However, the PRA does not in fact require any
thing to be released to the public. The agency decides what to release,
and then the PRA kicks in with regard to how that release must occur.
"Public information" is defined as any information, regardless of form
or format, that an agency discloses, disseminates, or makes available to
the public."®^ One might argue that if any agency responds to a FOIA
request, it has made information "available to the public, so any docu
ment released under FOIA is public information for purposes of the
PRA. However, that argument puts more weight on "public than the
term can bear; release to a member of the public is not the same as
information.^^

"32 Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2006).
<53 See generally id. at § 3506.
64 Id. at § 3501(7).
65 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, sec. 2, § 3506(d)(1), 109 Stat.
171, 174-75 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3506(d)(1) (2006)). "Agency" is defined broadly to in
clude "any executive department, military department. Government corporation. Government
controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Governnient (in
cluding the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency." Id. at
§ 3502(1).
.
, ,
66 Id. at § 3506(d)(1)(C). One might have hoped that agencies did not require a legal
mandate to operate in an efficient, effective, and economical manner. In any event, they have
such a mandate.
67 See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(12) (2006).
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release to the public at large. And in any event, such a reading still
applies only to something that has been requested, if only once. In
short, the PRA does not impose any affirmative duty of disclosure. It
does, as a practical matter, require that agencies post what information
they do release to a website, but the threshold determination regarding
what to release lies with the agency and/or rules stemming from other
statutes.
B.

0MB

The OMB, which is charged with implementation of the PRA,"^®
has endorsed dissemination of agency information in electronic form.
OMB Circular A-130, first issued in 1985''^ and revised several times
since, "contains the most comprehensive statement of executive branch
information policy."^" Adopted under the authority of the PRA, among
other statutes, the Circular applies to all federal agencies. The Circular
provides the following:
(8) Electronic Information Dissemination. Agencies shall use elec
tronic media and formats, including public networks, as appropri
ate and within budgetary constraints, in order to make
government information more easily accessible and useful to the
public. The use of electronic media and formats for information
dissemination is appropriate under the following conditions:
(a) The agency develops and maintains the information
electronically;
(b) Electronic media or formats are practical and cost effective
ways to provide public access to a large, highly detailed vol
ume of information;
(c) The agency disseminates the product frequently;
(d) The agency knows a substantial portion of users have ready
access to the necessary information technology and training
to use electronic information dissemination products;
Indeed, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, charged with overseeing the
implementation, was created by this legislation. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-511, sec. 2(a), § 3503(a), 94 Stat. 2814 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3503

(2006)).
69 Management of Federal Information Resources, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,730 (Dec. 24, 1985)
(issuing OMB Circular A-130).
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Freedom of Information, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 391, 400
(1998).

594

CARDOZO PUB. LAW, POLICY & ETHICS J.

[Vol. 7:577

(e) A change to electronic dissemination, as the sole means of
disseminating the product, will not impose substantial acqui
sition or training costs on users, especially State and local gov
ernments and small business entities.^'

More recently, spurred in part by the E-Government Act, which is dis
cussed in detail infra, OMB has continued to press agencies to have
electronic retrieval sources of increasing sophistication, searchabihty,
and ease of use.^^
Like the PRA itself, OMB's Circular and memoranda strongly en
dorse posting materials to the web if the agency is otherwise distributing
them. But they do not contain an affirmative requirement to distribute
anything at all.
C.

The E-Govemment Act

One would expect that if there was one important piece of legisla
tion moving the government online, it would be the E-Government Act,
signed into law in December 2002.^^ The Act's goals and rhetoric are
lofty, but its actual requirements are modest. Two provisions cover
agency websites. Section 206(b) provides:
To the extent practicable as determined by the agency in consultation
with the Director, each agency (as defined under section 551 of title 5,
United States Code) shall ensure that a publicly accessible Federal
Government website includes all information about that agency re
quired to be published in the Federal Register under paragraphs (1)
and (2) of section 552(a) of title 5, United States Code.^^

This sounds good, but really does nothing, for four reasons. First,
it is limited by the introductory escape clause; the agency need only do
any of this "to the extent [it deems] practicable." Second, the provision
contains a major drafting glitch. It requires posting of information that
71 Management of Federal Information Resources, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,068, 36,073 Quly 2,
1993) (revising Circular A-130); OMB Circular A-130 at § 8.a.8.
72 See, e.g.. Memorandum from Clay Johnson, Deputy Director for Management, OMB, to
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Improving Public Access to and Dissemination
of Government Information and Using the Federal Enterprise Architecture Data Reference
Model (Dec. 16, 2005).
73 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified in scattered
sections of 44 U.S.C.).
74 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (note) (2006).
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section 552(a)(2) requires be published in the Federal Register, but sec
tion 552(a)(2) does not require any information to be published in the
Federal Register. Section 552(a)(1) identifies various items that must be
published in the Federal Register, subsection (a)(2), in contrast, only re
quires that the agency "make available for public inspection and copy
ing" certain other records. Read literally, the Act s reference to
subsection (a)(2) is gibberish; The information about that agency re
quired to be published in the Federal Register under paragraph ... (2)
of section 552(a)" is the null set. Third, if the provision is read as re
quiring website posting of (a)(2) material, it merely duplicates what
EFOIA already requires. Fourth, it does not apply to all (a)(2) informa
tion but only to "information about the agency." Thus, section 206
proves meaningless as a legal requirement of affirmative disclosure.
Section 207 of the E-Government Act also promises more than it
delivers. That section expressly requires that agencies have websites that
include:
(i) descriptions of the mission and statutory authority of the
agency;(ii) information made available to the public under subsections
(a)(1) and (b) of section 552 of title 5, United States Code . . . ;
(iii) information about the organizational structure of the agency; and
(iv) the strategic plan of the agency.^^
Like Section 206, this provision is essentially meaningless. Again,
it requires posting of information that would seem to already be re
quired to be included in the electronic reading room. And it too has its
own drafting gaffe, referring to "information made available to the pub
lic" under 552(b). But section 552(b) contains the exceptions to
FOIA'S disclosure requirements. Presumably, this is a scrivener s error;
the reference should have been to subsections (a)(1) and (2) of section
552."^^

In short, the E-Government Act is a classic example of Congress
passing symbolic legislation and leading from behind, imposing a tooth
less mandate on agencies to do what they are already doing. Indeed, the
very fact that these provisions have produced no decided cases and virtu
ally no discussion of their drafting gibberish indicates how inconsequen
tial they have been. Prompted by constituent demands, technological
75 E-Government Act, Pub. L. No. 107-347. 116 Stat. 2899, at § 207(f)(1)(A) (codified at
44 U.S.C. § 3401(note) (2006)).
76 Gerrard & Herz, supra note 46, at 47.
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changes, prodding from the White House and OMB, and their own
professionalism, agencies have made very significant gains in affirmative
disclosures. But not because they have had to and not to the extent they
could and should.
VI.

CONCLUSION: ABANDONING THE REQUEST-DRIVEN MODEL

FOIA's request-driven model has never been more of an anachro
nism. The 1996 EFOIA Amendments reflected this fact and took a step
toward meaningful affirmative disclosures even absent particular re
quests. It should go without saying that agencies should fully comply
with these requirements; not all presently do. But the 1996 Amend
ments remain fundamentally tied to the need for a request. Other legis
lation promises more transparency but fails in fact to impose additional
requirements for affirmative disclosure.
As technology develops, and the society-wide shift towards "free
dom of information" in the non-statutory, more abstract sense contin
ues, agencies have increasingly placed information on their websites.
But they have not yet taken the bold but no longer unthinkable step:
simply place all non-exempt records on the web.^^ Nothing is stopping
them.
FOIA sets a minimum; subject to external legal constraints, such as
the Privacy Act,^® the Information Quality Act,^^ and trade secret pro77 A recent task force report recommends that agencies do exactly this. See GARY COGLIANESE, HEATHER KILMARTIN, & EVAN MENDELSON, TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICI
PATION IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS; A NONPARTISAN PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION TASK
FORCE REPORT 9-11, available at http://lsr.neIIco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=I252&con-

text=upenn/wps (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). "Agencies should streamline the FOIA request
process by publishing electronically . . . any documents that an agency or court has previously
determined not to fall with a FOIA exemption." Id.
78 Designed to protect individual privacy. The Privacy Act, enacted in 1974 and codified at
5 U.S.C. § 552a, restricts agencies' ability to release,
information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not
limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or em
ployment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or
other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print
or a photograph.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (2006).
79 The Information Quality Act, found in the General Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2765, has just two provisions, codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516
note. First, § 515(a) requires OMB to issue guidelines under the Paperwork Reduction Act "that
provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) dis
seminated by Federal agencies." Second, § 515(b) requires each agency to (a) issue its own
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tections, agencies are free to make public documents that FOIA does
not require them to release or post. As early as 1993, three years before
passage of EFOIA, President Clinton had circulated a memo stating:
"Each agency has a responsibility to distribute information on its own
initiative, and to enhance public access through the use of electronic
information systems."®" And as noted, President Bush's E.G. 13,392
nudges agencies towards broader online posting of material that has not
in fact been requested and is not required to be placed in the electronic
reading room by section 552(a)(2).
DOJ uses the term "affirmative disclosure" to refer to posting
records as required by 552(a)(2) and the term "proactive disclosure" to
refer to posting material without any legal obligation to do so.®^ Posting
material that may be, though has not yet been, the subject of FOIA
requests can reduce the need for such requests.®^ So proactive posting is
one way of ameliorating the perennial and intractable problem of delay
in answering requests. But that is a rather unambitious understanding
of what proactive disclosure might consist of. It is undeniably a step
beyond the current statute, for it does not require an actual request to
trigger dissemination. But it is still keyed to the question of what citi
zens might ask for rather than what citizens might find useful. Because
requestors generally, and by definition, do not know what the agency
has, the requestor-based system will always be incomplete.
guidelines consistent with OMB's guidelines, which also ensure and maximize the quality, objec
tivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by the agency; (b) establish an adminis
trative mechanism allowing affected persons to obtain corrections of information maintained
and disseminated by the agency that does not comply with the guidelines; and (c) file an annual
report with OMB regarding complaints received about the accuracy of information disseminated
by the agency. Though innocuous looking, the Act likely creates, and was intended to create,
some disincentives to public dissemination of information possessed by the agency. For a critical
assessment that stresses this feature, see THOMAS O. MCGARITY ET AL.. CENTER FOR PROGRES
SIVE REGULATION, TRUTH AND SCIENCE BETRAYED: THE CASE AGAINST THE INFORMATION
QUALITY ACT (2005).

Memorandum from President William J. Clinton, to the Heads of Departments and
Agencies, on The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 4, 1993).
81 See U.S. D.O.J., Office of Information & Privacy, Executive Order 13,392 Implementation
Guidance, FOIA POST, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2006foiapost6.htm.
82 Id.-, see also Exec. Order No. 13,392 § 3(b)(ii). This executive order states the following:
The plan shall include specific activities that the ^ency will implement to eliminate
or reduce the agency's FOIA backlog, including . . . increased reliance on the dissemi
nation of records that can be made available to the public through a website or other
means that do not require the public to make a request for the records under the
FOIA.
Id.
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Given its history, it seems unlikely that Congress will get out ahead
on this issue and require agencies to do so. But at the start of the
Obama Administration, which has shown both a greater ostensible com
mitment to transparency, and certainly greater sophistication about the
internet, than any of its predecessors, the moment may be ripe for a
voluntary or newly mandated effort to genuine freedom of information.
On his first full day in office, the new president issued two memoranda
that augur such a future. In a memorandum on transparency and open
government, the president declared the following:
Government should be transparent. Transparency promotes accounta
bility and provides information for citizens about what their Govern
ment is doing. Information maintained by the Federal Government is
a national asset. My Administration will take appropriate action, con
sistent with law and policy, to disclose information rapidly in forms
that the public can readily find and use. Executive departments and
agencies should harness new technologies to put information about
their operations and decisions online and readily available to the pub
lic. Executive departments and agencies should also solicit public
feedback to identify information of greatest use to the public.®^
And in a memorandum focused on FOIA specifically, he announced "a
new era of open government" and a "presumption of disclosure, under
which "agencies should take affirmative steps to make information pub
lic. They should not wait for specific requests from the public."®^ In
pursuance of this directive. Attorney General Holder's FOIA memoran
dum expressly states that "agencies should readily and systematically
post information online in advance of any public request."®^
It is too early to tell whether this early commitment and enthusi
asm will persist and flourish through the months and years of actual
governing. But we should hope they will.

Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, supra note 17.
84 Memorandum from President Barak Obama, to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, on the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).
85 Holder Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3.

